Key, Brian (2016) Why fish do not feel pain. Animal Sentience 3(1) (after reading the article, read the abstracts of some of the commentaries too, for contrary vuews).
Only humans can report feeling pain. In contrast, pain in animals is typically inferred on the basis of nonverbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these behavioural data can be problematic when the reliability and validity of the behavioural tests are questionable. The thesis proposed here is based on the bioengineering principle that structure determines function. Basic functional homologies can be mapped to structural homologies across a broad spectrum of vertebrate species. For example, olfaction depends on olfactory glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs of the forebrain, visual orientation responses depend on the laminated optic tectum in the midbrain, and locomotion depends on pattern generators in the spinal cord throughout vertebrate phylogeny, from fish to humans. Here I delineate the region of the human brain that is directly responsible for feeling painful stimuli. The principal structural features of this region are identified and then used as biomarkers to infer whether fish are, at least, anatomically capable of feeling pain. Using this strategy, I conclude that fish lack the necessary neurocytoarchitecture, microcircuitry, and structural connectivity for the neural processing required for feeling pain.
Only humans can report feeling pain. In contrast, pain in animals is typically inferred on the basis of nonverbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these behavioural data can be problematic when the reliability and validity of the behavioural tests are questionable. The thesis proposed here is based on the bioengineering principle that structure determines function. Basic functional homologies can be mapped to structural homologies across a broad spectrum of vertebrate species. For example, olfaction depends on olfactory glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs of the forebrain, visual orientation responses depend on the laminated optic tectum in the midbrain, and locomotion depends on pattern generators in the spinal cord throughout vertebrate phylogeny, from fish to humans. Here I delineate the region of the human brain that is directly responsible for feeling painful stimuli. The principal structural features of this region are identified and then used as biomarkers to infer whether fish are, at least, anatomically capable of feeling pain. Using this strategy, I conclude that fish lack the necessary neurocytoarchitecture, microcircuitry, and structural connectivity for the neural processing required for feeling pain.
Going off of the themes we've discussed in class recently, I'm inclined to say that this paper is another example where the focus is on the wrong thing. Key is saying that "pain is in the brain" and lists the requirements for feeling pain - all of these requirements are involved with the brain only (ex. organization of pain related neural areas). He uses this evidence to suggest that fish don't feel pain. But as we've discussed, all of the processes of the brain and body can be accounted for in the easy problem. This paper fails to acknowledge the potential of something beyond the physical brain as having any potential to have a feeling being. I have a hard time being convinced by arguments that leave out what is, in my opinion, a very relevant consideration, especially given the implications that arise if we assume fish do not feel pain.
ReplyDeletePlease read the commentaries to see how many ways Key's conclusions are contradicted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience and evolution, without any recourse to supernatural explanations.
DeleteMy first thought after reading Key’s “Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain” is that Key seems very wrong. He argues that because fish are lacking certain structural features associated with pain in human beings they must not be able to experience pain. Further, he says that any observable reactions that fish have to being impaled by fishing hooks or suffocating out of water are due to reflexes and that fish are not in fact experiencing pain. First of all, we can never have a comprehensive and complete understanding of pain in fish as we are not fish. Second, it seems as though Key is far too confident in his structure-function analysis of pain. Even in human beings, we do not have a full understanding of this structure-function relationship. Moreover, as we have discussed in class, most of us would not kick a T3 robot. In other words, we would not assume that something is not in pain just because it doesn’t have the same internal structure as we do. We would not need to cut it open and examine its insides but rather, we would observe from its behaviours and reactions that it is experiencing pain when those behaviours and reactions are similar to the way we behave when we are in pain. To that same point, as the other-minds problem suggests, we can never know for sure that other people experience pain the same way we do. However, we still carry on behaving as though we are sure they do. Finally, from an evolutionary standpoint, why would we evolve reactions to physical damage like recoiling or otherwise exhibiting distress associated with pain, while when fish behave in the same manner, it is just reflex?
ReplyDeleteBronwyn, this was my reaction too. I especially appreciate your point that “[e]ven in human beings, we do not have a full understanding of this structure-function relationship”. Throughout the paper, it felt like Key was assuming far too much certainty in our understanding of vertebrate pain. And, not adequately appreciating the value of giving fish and other non-vertebrates the benefit of the doubt (what really got me was when he compared not harming fish on the off chance that they do feel pain to being an antivaxer).
DeleteIf Key were right, though, and it is really only vertebrates that feel pain, it seems to make the hard problem even harder to explain. Again you made a great point, saying, "from an evolutionary standpoint, why would we evolve reactions to physical damage like recoiling or otherwise exhibiting distress associated with pain, while when fish behave in the same manner, it is just reflex?”. Key goes through a list of neuroanatomical features he considers necessary for feeling pain which differ substantially from what is seen in the invertebrate brain of a fish. If organisms like fish can adaptively interact with their world with a much simpler neural system (avoid danger, eat prey, snuggle when they are touched, etc.), why would a highly complicated system have evolved in other species? For example, if a simple feed-forward system is capable of producing all the complex behaviours fish display, allowing them to react to stimuli adequately enough for it to, from a behavioural standpoint, seem like they are feeling pain, why would a more complex reciprocal feedback system have evolved in vertebrates just so they can have this additional layer of feeling pain?
I don’t agree with Key that the evidence he cites decides the question of whether fish feel pain, but it does raise the interesting question of, if pain (feeling) is unnecessary to the development of complex adaptive behaviours (including learning mechanisms - as Key’s notes, fish display operant learning behaviour), then why would the ability to feel ever have been developed?
Both of you make good comments. And, yes, the question of how and why any organism feels pain is yet another version of the "hard problem." "Nociceptive" behaviors and mechanisms (to detect, escape and avoid body damage) are easily explained by evolution. But the fact that body damage is felt as pain is not.
DeleteBut the hard problem has no bearing at all on the fact that (some) organisms do feel pain, nor on what needs to be done to prevent people from inflicting it.
Bronwen, I completely agree with your points. By virtue of the other minds problem, we can’t be sure that others feel, let alone feel pain. Key applies a biased framework in which he identifies structures he deems necessary for feeling pain (in vertebrates), and claims that because they’re different in the fish brain, fish must not feel pain.
DeleteOne of the commentaries by Victoria Braithwaite argues against Key, explaining that it isn’t sufficient to conclude that human neural mechanisms and structures are the only ones that can process pain. Braithwaite also argues that an understanding of pain in animals (both human and non-human) ”needs to be based within a framework of consciousness” (I assume as opposed to a neuroarchitectural or neuroscientific framework). Indeed, Key’s claim that the mere presence or absence of certain brain areas or mechanisms is enough to assert feeling or non-feeling is too restrictive. Not only that, but it violates the other minds problem.
I have a feeling that such research is prone to going around in circles given this barrier to understanding feeling in others — would it ever be possible, then, to make a claim about feeling at all?
The other-minds problem (which is about whether others are feeling or thinking, and only secondarily about what they are feeling or thinking) is trivial in the case of other human beings. No one seriously doubts, or has any (serious) reason to doubt that other people feel. Descartes' point was about whether it is certain that they feel, not about whether it is true. There are plenty of things that are true that we can't be 100% sure are true.
DeleteSo the only thing some people go around in circles about is certainty. But not even the law of gravity is certain...
And it's almost as certain for mammals and birds and most other vertebrates and invertebrates.
A lot of the doubt about whether nonhuman animals feel is cognitive dissonance (we don't want to believe we are doing such cruel things to feeling beings) but seeing is believing -- and that's why ag-gag is such a huge obstacle (as Paul McCartney said).
“Moreover, as we have discussed in class, most of us would not kick a T3 robot. In other words, we would not assume that something is not in pain just because it doesn’t have the same internal structure as we do”
DeleteBronwen, I loved reading your thoughts and I share a lot of them. This quote brought to mind something I remember from a previous thread, the example that some people cannot experience physical pain (Congenital insensitivity to pain and anhidrosis). I know I would still not attempt to injure them, despite the fact that they would not experience pain because I recognize it would be bad for me (morally, in terms of social repercussions, etc). This brings to mind a different but related issue, what about us (or inside of us) dictates the way we feel about the pain of others? Could it be that in considering those of our own kin we are much more sensitive in the way we weigh their pain than we are of the pain of other species? Is there something biological that overrides this concern for other animals if it could benefit our kin? For example, wouldn’t it be adaptive to assume those similar to us experience pain like we do, and to assume that those different from us must not because we need to hold this belief in order to justify harming them for our own benefit?
I admit I have not done much of this research prior to posting this comment, nor am I attempting to justify harm against animals, but these are some thoughts that have come to mind in reaction to this thread. I also wonder why Key and others feel so strongly about this, despite contradicting evidence from cognitive neuroscience as Harnad mentioned above. I wonder if these beliefs (that animals do or cannot experience pain like we do) used to hold an adaptive advantage that is no longer relevant for our current environment, as many of us do not need to subsist by eating meat.
Hi all, I think everyone in this thread has made some excellent points. Key’s argument hinges on the assumption that all pain can be explained in terms of the human definition and conception of pain. Holding all other organisms to the same standards simply does not make sense, even in light of the Other Minds Problem. Though, like Bronwen said, we cannot know what it feels like to be another organism without being that organism, we are still able to draw some broad conclusions based on what we have observed over time. Polar bears, for example, live in temperatures that range in the negative degrees, and they seem to be doing fine, climate change and the warming of the ice caps aside. We cannot be completely certain of this because we are not polar bears, but since they have not migrated out of freezing climates over time, it seems like a safe bet. I, however, would most likely die if constantly exposed to the same temperatures as polar bears, and I would definitely be in pain. My threshold for pain with regards to temperature is much different than that of a polar bear’s.
DeleteAll this being said, I feel comfortable saying that polar bears do not feel pain in the same way we do when it comes to freezing temperatures. So, why is Key using a human framework of pain for fish? Due to my disagreement with his premises, I can neither follow his argument nor sympathize with his conclusion. Caroline rightfully brings up Braithwaite’s commentary in which she says understanding pain “needs to be based within a framework of consciousness.” Once again, though, the Other Minds Problem limits us from knowing what exactly is going on in the heads of other organisms with regards to consciousness. I do not want to say that we are stuck in a loop of “we can’t know this for sure because of the OMP,” but it definitely seems this way — at least for now.
Week 11 has inspired some very thoughtful skies, even if fewer than many of the less consequential weeks.
DeleteMadeleine, yes, the Blind (and Insentient and Indifferent) Watchmaker has instilled selfish genes in us. But, out of Laziness, the means of overcoming them, too.
Emma, it’s not that polar bears feel a different kind of pain. It’s that what hurts them is different from what hurts us.
Hi Bronwen,
DeleteTo respond to your question: Finally, from an evolutionary standpoint, why would we evolve reactions to physical damage like recoiling or otherwise exhibiting distress associated with pain, while when fish behave in the same manner, it is just reflex?” I think it would still be evolutionary beneficial to physically behave as though one were in pain even if they did not feel pain because it would cause other beings to react accordingly. For instance, sociopaths do not feel empathy, but they can still mimic the behaviors that an empathetic person can do, allowing them to manipulate how others treat them. In a similar manner, if a fish acts like it’s in pain (maybe not by choice but just by reflex), perhaps a predator (like a human) will stop physically harming it.
Hi Professor, thanks for your reply! You say that polar bears are not necessarily feeling a different kind of pain. However, as I understand it, is that not a violation of the Other Minds Problem? We cannot know if polar bears are experiencing and feeling pain the same way we are, because we are not polar bears. I must admit that I do not know everything there is to know about polar bears, but unless the explanation is that we experience the same kinds of pain down to the individual neurons and nociceptors, I am struggling to see how we can draw this conclusion. I understand that what hurts us is not necessarily what hurts them and vice versa, but I’m not positive that we can say polar bears experience the same kinds of pain without actually being polar bears.
DeleteHi Emma, from my understanding I believe that what the professor might be trying to say is that even if we are unsure that they may or may not feel the same pain that we do, the reason that polar bears are don't feel the same pain as you would in freezing temperature isn't because of the way they feel pain but rather that what they feel pain to is different than us. This had me thinking of an example brought up in one of my other classes where if you are to put fire near your internal organs, for example your intestines, you actually would not feel any pain. This doesn't mean that the pain you do feel is any different but simply that your internal organs don't have the nociceptors to detect thermal pain. You would however feel pain when your intestine is enlarged, for example, because you do have nociceptor that will respond to that type of pain. in the case of polar bears, the reason as to why they would not be in pain under such freezing environments is due to the fact that their nociceptors are adapted to their evolutionary necessities to survive which are different from ours.
DeleteEvolutionarily, feelings exist must because there is an adaptive advantage. So what would that advantage be? I propose that, if our ancesters didn't have feelings, their chance of survival will be significantly lower. It's hard to imagine what have no feelings at all is like, but just thinking about what would happen if we don't feel pain. Analgesia is such an example, and most people with it live short because they often hurt themselves seriously without even knowing it. Therefore even losing the feeling of pain can be lethal, let alone without any feeling.
DeleteWhile the reading Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain was written by a biomedical science researcher and substantially had a scientific lens, the discussion surrounding qualia extends beyond this domain. This paper reminded me largely of what I learned about qualia in another course at McGill, Philosophy of Mind PHIL306. I’m specifically referring to the absent qualia argument which seeks to refute physicalism or functionalism by showing that even when all relevant physical or functional facts are fixed, qualia can still be absent. Therefore asserting that the phenomenon of qualia is not fixed by the physical or functional. While Key describes that fish are lacking the structural features or nociceptors that humans have to experience pain, it’s interesting that the absent qualia argument argues that even if there were the same features in fish, they still might not be able to feel pain or at least in the same qualitative capacity as we humans verbalize/experience.
DeleteMelody, it’s much more adaptive for fish to hide pain or injury and flee rather than alert predators that they are disabled.
DeleteEmma, yes, because of OMP we can never be sure; but the Precautionary Principle is to give animals the benefit of the doubt if they act as if they’re in pain, or if something happens to them that would be painful for us. But in the case of the polar bear, I think there’s no need for a different kind of pain: just more fur and fat and a different metabolism as an evolutionary adaptation to the climate it lives in (grizzlies who migrated north). (I’m also not sure what a “different kind of pain” would mean: We have lots of different kinds of pain; probably they do too; there’s no reason to think that thermoception (temperature detection) in mammals would be very different, though the sensitivity ranges would no doubt be.)
Mariana, No doubt polar bears have different nociceptive thresholds for cold (and different insulation too).
Zilong, explaining the evolutionary advantage of nociception (damage detection) and escape is much easier than explaining why nociception (or any sensory activity) would be felt at all (hard problem) rather than just being detected and acted upon. (If you want to imagine what it’s like to be an insentient organism, imagine what it’s like to be a plant, or a single-celled microbe; neither has the neural organ to feel pain – or anything – with.)
Melissa, when philosophers talk about zombies, especially in the context of living organisms, I’m afraid they don’t have anything useful to offer. For the fish (or my inner pig, or Descartes’ dog) this is not a theoretical problem.
Given what we know about the hard problem, namely that we cannot come up with how or why we feel, isn't the same question about how/why a fish feels doomed to fail from the start?
ReplyDeleteJust because there are neural/psychophysical correlates of feeling in humans doesn't explain how/why we feel. Similarly, not having neural correlates of pain in fish could never explain how/why a fish can't feel pain. Isn't the wrong question being asked by including the word "feel", as we now know that only the feeler can be certain when they are and aren't feeling something?
The question is about feeling. But you are mixing up the HP and the OMP. Can you disentangle them?
DeleteWould it be that the hard problem relates to how and why a fish would experience fear, and the OMP relates to the fact that we cannot determine what a fish feels and knows?
DeleteYes. Nor whether.
DeleteLike my peers, I disagree with some of the contents of this paper. More precisely, with how Key seems to imply that the value of fish is in accordance with their experience of pain (or lack of). Does it really matter is a species cannot consciously experience pain in particular? Physical pain, which is “registered” via nociception in fish, does leave traces that can affect multiple other neural pathways and survival in itself. Although the loss of a fin may not be understood and felt as painful for a fish, it will definitely complicate its survival and add additional stress to its everyday life. Even if Key were correct, meaning that fish do not feel pain, this does not exclude the possibility of fish feeling other emotions, which could be impacted by a “painful” experience. Of course, to prove this we would need extensive studies (which may always be limited by the other minds problem), but it should not be assumed that pain cannot be felt otherwise. More importantly, using only the experience of pain as an indicator for consciousness and attributing a value to a species based on it dismisses the complexity of consciousness.
ReplyDeletePlease also look at the critique of Key's peers in the same journal.
DeleteIn addition to my previous post, I have an issue with comparing a fish’s brain anatomy and function to that of humans. It is possible that different connections and circuitry lead to “feelings” in fish that we may ignore because they are very different from ours. For all we know, fish might feel pain and other emotions in ways that parallel our own feelings. However, because the hardware would be very different, it would be hard for us to observe the right brain areas and to compare activation in a fish’s brain to our own. Key does bring up that fish may feel “fish pain”, but disagrees because of the four neuroanatomical features he believes make you capable of feeling pain. Who knows, maybe there are other ways of feeling/understanding pain that we ignore.
ReplyDeleteThere are many examples in evolution in which the same capacity is accomplished with different neural or even peripheral means.
DeleteIn agreement with you, Camille, I cannot find Key’s arguments to be entirely sound and altogether convincing. As others have pointed out, Key postulates that fish lack the neuroanatomical structures required processing the perception of pain. I think it is perhaps more accurate to say that fish do not share mammalian neurological structures that are tied to pain perception. In humans and other mammals, these receptors and brain regions are not concretely understood, so who is to say that these regions are necessary across all biological classes, or even kingdoms as there is evidence that plants emit ultrasonic vibrations in response to pain-like stress. (https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/507590v4). I do not believe these researchers claim that this response is proof of plant consciousness, but it does demonstrate the complexity of biological responses that can be found in simpler organic systems. All this to be said, whether fish actually perceive pain in the way we understand it or not, isnt it best to avoid a harm and suffering to another organism, even one that does not reflect human or mammalian pain perception.
DeleteGenevieve, yes, the "Precautionary Principle" (which is just another way of stating the Golden Rule (and that the OMP is the victims', not ours.)
DeleteAn argument (among many) of Key's that I find problematic is when he uses studies demonstrating that fish don’t exhibit behavioural changes following a craniotomy to suggest that they are not experiencing post-craniotomy pain. The behaviours he refers to are "feeding, swimming, spawning, courtship behaviours, or building and tending to nests". Are these not all behaviours that are necessary for survival? If we are talking about subjective sensations of pain, I don't think these behavioural observations are sufficient to make such a claim. After all, humans and other organisms continue to carry out the daily activities necessary for survival while in pain or suffering all the time.
ReplyDeleteValid criticism. Besides, fish do behave differently after they have been hurt.
DeleteI think this is a great point and I think by selectively referring to these behaviors necessary for survival, Key limits the scope for potential evidence for a model of pain experience in fish, as seen in the numerous counter arguments. I think to Lucie’s point, this is partially due to what we take as evidence for “subjective feeling” versus automatic physical response. In an example like dogs or cats, it is easier to project our notion of subjective thinking on to them because many of their behaviors reflect ours and they exhibit behaviors that reflect long term responses to trauma. You often see examples of dogs or cats that have suffered horrible abuses and their demeanors completely change. They show signs of extreme fear and distrust to the point where they barely fend for themselves, look for food, etc. which I think we can relate to human experiences of responses to trauma as well. It seems kind of self-centered for humans to assume our behaviors of consciousness to be the baseline, when perhaps there is really just a communication gap between fish behavior and our behavior. We as humans rely so much on facial expression and body language to communicate, and a lot of that communication is not possible with fish. But the idea that we don’t see our own patterns suffering and pain in fish is not evidence that fish don’t have pain, but rather fish don’t express pain just as we do.
DeleteLeah, yes, it makes much more sense to conclude that species differ in how they express (or react to) pain than in how they feel it.
DeleteAs soon as I saw the title, I knew that I disagree with Key. If fish didn’t feel pain, why would it put all the effort trying to escape when getting caught, and resist harder when injured by traps or hooks? (Well he claimed that these are innate escape responses) Key’s main claim is that “fish lack the necessary neuroanatomical structures […] to perform neural processing necessary for feeling pain”. If Key’s concern was whether the fish could feel pain exactly as how humans do, his argumentation – lacking necessary structures – would be indeed appropriate, since, without the same structures, surely the process couldn’t be the same. However, as Braithwaite & Droege (2016) discussed in their commentary, Key admitted that the “process of convergent evolution allows different structures to perform the same function”. If so, lacing necessary structures should not be an obstacle for feeling pain.
ReplyDeleteBesides, in the conclusion, Key argued about how studies that suggested fish feel pain as they can learn to avoid electric shock supported his claim. He stated that since pallium are believed to be taken charge of feeling pain, the fact that pallial-lesioned fish exhibit the same escape response as controls indicates that these escape responses are processed unconsciously, and their behaviours are not results of feelings but rather of survival aims. This really confuses me. If they don’t feel pain, why would they deem the shock as a threat to survive and choose to avoid them?
A "nociceptive" reflex could generate escape, but that is not evidence that fish only have an escape reflex. Fish can also learn to avoid pain, just as vertebrates can.
DeleteThe Method of analysis Key uses to determine that fish do not feel are flawed. To begin with, he uses the the structural features of the pain sensing “region” in human brains and applies it to the brain of a fish. This is not a helpful method of determination as we have known for many years that the brains of different species vary considerably — we cannot reliably generalize findings in animals to humans, so why would we overgeneralize findings in humans to fish. Along this line, it seems as thought Key expects the fish brain to be laid out in the same way as the human brain, and thus react similarly to a craniotomy (in the same brain location). The claim that fish still display their “species specific behaviour” after this craniotomy is not sufficient to say that they do not feel pain, as many species maintain normal behaviour while experiencing pain. Furthermore, it is inaccurate to designate a region of the brain as ‘directly responsible’ for one function, and thus his claim that he is using the structural features of “this” region as biomarkers to use in fish is very un-neuroscientific of him. He goes on to claim that similar strategies are used in biological research (but not cognitive - the area of his question), but then goes on to list animal-specific advancements in understanding, such as the evolution of feathers and flight in birds. Seeing as humans do not have feathers and have not developed the capacity for flight, it appears to me that his support for using his analysis methods is not correlated to his justification. Finally, If we can assume Key’s use of “feeling pain” is a weasel-word for feeling in general (consciousness), it has clearly been proven that studying the architecture of the brain does not arise in a clearer understanding of feeling, as this has been attempted for decades (with no avail). Following this assessment, I agree with the commentary of Braithwaite that the framework Key is using, evolutionary biology and neuroscience, is inadequate to asses his question, and it should be based within a framework of consciousness.
ReplyDeleteI really enjoyed your summary of the article and would like to add some evidence from Bloom to support what you said. He writes:
Delete"Fish do not have an amygdala and hippocampus that is anatomically homologous to those of humans, but they have analogous brain areas whose function is to control and learn from emotional responses.”
This can be linked to other comments in this thread pointing to the fact that there is even natural variability in the brain structures among individual humans, so to expect the brains of fish to be identical in order to prove similar function is unrealistic, unproductive, and increasingly unsupported by neuroscience. He goes on to say that:
“I agree with Key that “pain involves conscious neural processing” but conclude that the evidence of pain system function in fish is so similar to that in humans and other mammals, it is not logical to deduce that fish cannot feel pain. Fish are sentient beings and public attitudes to them are gradually changing as scientific evidence for their capabilities accumulates (Broom, 2014).” Broom also cites that fish commonly show 17/18 of the pain perception criteria listed by Sneddon that we see in humans. Key makes some remarkable and unsubstantiated leaps in his article to draw the conclusions he has.
Ainsley, good points. Brian Key is as tenacious as a climate-change denier or anti-vaxxer ( and as rational): all familiar symptoms of cognitive dissonance, which only get stronger and shriller as the counterevidence against your rationalization grows (as Madelaine notes).
DeleteAs the critiques of many of my peers have pointed out, Key’s reasoning severely oversimplifies and brushes over the problem of feeling. He describes “conscious processing” as being
ReplyDelete“dependent on at least two non-mutually exclusive processes: signal amplification and global integration across the surface of the cerebral cortex”,
as if there were not hundreds of years of cognitive and philosophical inquiry that sought to solve a problem that he purports to solve in one sentence. The hubris! While the differing anatomical brain structures of fish and humans could surely indicate that they feel things in different kinds of ways. This is an obvious point between any animal and humans: the origins of language in the human brain mean that things like pain can develop meanings extraneous to their direct sensation--you are more likely to find a masochist human than a masochist fish, I think although I doubt there are any studies to back that up! But as for the problem of “conscious processing”, which I believe is just a weasel word for feeling; it is far from having been solved by neuroscience (which is really good at the easy problem but has a lot of work to do if it’ll be solving the hard problem any time soon). So Key’s pointing to anatomical brain structure to solve the problem he is attempting to solve is precisely him jumping the gun on the problem of feeling.
So true Sofia! The hard problem is nowhere near a point where it can be explained away in a mere sentence. I think it's also arrogant of him to so confidently label fish as incapable of conscious processing when a clear and agreed upon definition of consciousness does not even exist! How is it possible to attach a concrete label when the label itself is nonexistent?
DeleteThe problem is not with defining feeling. We all know what it feels like to feel. If anything is well-grounded, it's that! The cognitive dissonance, and the weasel-words, come from our failed attempts to explain how and why (which, unlike "fish" and "feel," happen to be function words rather than content words; function words are the only words about which Wittgenstein -- who says "the meaning of words is in their use" -- is not wrong).
DeleteHey Sofia, I completely agree with your point; Key’s reasoning does severely oversimplify and the problem of feeling. In Key's article, he argues that other species like fish are sentient if they have the same biomarkers in the human brain that are directly responsible for feeling pain. He concluded that fish are unable to feel pain because they lack the neural structure required. However, although fish do not have the exact same neurobiological components as humans, many studies prove they do have the capacity to feel. In fact, when I had a pet fish as a kid, I would infer what he was feeling by his behavior because fish cannot communicate (other-minds problem). We then got a dog and once again, it was clear to me when he was in discomfort/pain by his behavior. Therefore, I don’t believe an organisms’ brain needs to be completely structured like ours to feel.
DeleteI totally agree with the points made in this threat. Not only did Kay overgeneralize and assume that fish required the same structures as humans in order to feel pain but just disregards that there are other possible explanations and network that could allow fish to feel pain. Although he acknowledges that there could be some sort of “fish pain”, he seems to be certain that they still require the mechanisms found in humans for us to be able to say that they feel pain. This reasoning is flawed in many ways as discussed in other skywriting, but I believe that even if Kay was right and they don’t feel pain you are still harming them when putting them through noxious stimuli. Hurting fish on the argument that they can’t feel would be the same thing as saying that you would hurt another human being in the case that they weren’t able to feel it. Regardless of what they may or may not perceive as pain, noxious stimuli will harm them and have consequences on the their survival.
DeleteMelissa, yes, trust our mind-reading ability: It's real, and it's very powerful. Not 100%, but even with language understanding is not 100%.
DeleteMariana, I agree that it feels wrong to harm a living organism, even if they don't feel (e.g., trees and plants). But with feeling organisms it matters even more.
This article has me reminiscing back on Prof Harnad’s question: “Why would our ancestors have evolved to feel pain rather than just detect bodily damage when merely detecting damage can enhance survival as well?”. We now know that explaining how and why we evolved to feel pain rather than just detect is the hard problem. But putting the hard problem aside for now, I would first like to review a few points that we have (seemingly) have reached a consensus on before commenting on Key’s argument.
ReplyDelete1. Cartesian Certainty : We have no doubt that (our own) mental states are felt states.
2. Other Minds Problem : We can never be sure of what other minds are thinking or feeling; we can only infer by observing their behavior.
3. Mind-Reading Capacity : Despite OMP, human species have a powerful ability to empathize with other humans and (correctly) infer what others are thinking/feeling by their words and behavior. This is yet another product of our lazy evolution which was adaptive because such ability helped ensure the survival of our offspring.
Now for my comments on Key:
1. If there was an adaptive advantage to having mental states as felt states for mammalian species, why are we so quick to assume that the same couldn’t have been adaptive for other invertebrates? Lazy evolution allows for great flexibility and if indeed feeling pain is adaptive (which it obviously must have been for us at least), it would have allowed for different mechanisms for different species depending on its EEA rather than fixate on one. Key’s conclusion that fish do not feel pain is underdetermined by setting mammalian neuroanatomy/neurocircuitry as the standard for the capacity to feel pain. We know and readily accept that different structures in different species can serve comparable functional roles. Why is it then we when attribute feelings (pain) to species that show different behavioral/neural tendencies, it is called “anthropomorphic” and “biased interpretations”? Is this yet another form of cognitive dissonance?
2. When giving us our mind-reading capacity, lazy evolution (again) did what it always does and allowed for flexibility. We do not only empathize (mind-read) our own species, but often do so with other species (that we assume to be sentient) as well. There’s a reason why we call dogs a man’s best friend. Although (as mentioned by Prof Harnad) across-species mind-reading becomes much harder as we approach more simple organisms, the other mind’s problem barrier is often overcome with most species and importantly species that we cause suffering to. Key seems to undermine/disregard this ability of ours to (somewhat) penetrate the OMP. He states: “ The idea that it is more benevolent to assume that fish feel pain, rather than not feel pain, has emerged as one position of compromise in the debate on fish consciousness. However, accepting such as assumption at “face value” in biology can lead to devastating consequences ”. And to this statement, I want to ask Key: What is more devastating than causing unnecessary mass suffering for years on end?
I agree with both of your points. I think our use of the anthropomorphic label goes back to our tendency to judge consciousness in relation to our own human experience, like how we can more readily identify signs of feeling in primates because they look and act very similarly to us. The label "anthropomorphic" I think perfectly encapsulates our being stuck in this human-centric idea of consciousness. Our scope of what consciousness, even for just humans, is so limited.
DeleteBoth spot-on.
DeleteLeah, I completely agree with the notion that the human-centric idea of consciousness is a big problem when it comes to even pondering the consciousness and ability to feel of animals. There have many good points critiquing Key's article (from both his peers and mine in their skywritings), and I believe that the recent weeks have been very eye opening to my implicit bias towards the human experience, bias which I have honestly never even considered prior to taking this course. It is impossible, in my mind, to compare the human experience and human pain and feeling to other animals, which could very easily have other ways of emoting, feeling, and experiencing existance.
DeleteBut pain hurts, and that's what matters. Not whether it hurts this way or that way.
DeleteIt is quite confusing to say that fish do not feel pain as we do. Here, Key argues that because fish do not have feelings because they do not have the same structural features as those associated with pain in the human brain. Key asserts that behaviours that could be read as pain are simply reflexes, and fishes in fact do not feel anything. This got me thinking about T3 robots, and especially “would you kick Eric?”, and we’ve determined that we don’t need to pick someone apart to assume that they have feelings, especially pain. While we cannot feel or accurately know someone else’s feelings, through empathy we can infer them, and the same could be done to fish. Just because fish are different from humans does not mean that they are not sentient. We still do not understand human feelings, and we have the capacity to communicate and speak about them, fish don’t, so how can we definitely assert that fish do not feel?
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, from an evolutionary perspective, it is clear that an organism would want to avoid damage for their survival, and pain is such a way to inform the organism about this. If humans have feelings, why would the reflex in fish evolve without the feeling of pain? Or put another way, why would humans feel pain and not fish? What would be the benefit from this? This is still the hard problem, how and why we feel, how and why sentience evolved?
Perhaps, naming a pain avoiding behaviour a “reflex”, separating the feeling of pain from nociception is a means to avoid an uncomfortable truth. Although fish do not have the same neural structures as we do, this doesn’t necessarily mean that they do not feel. Recognizing that they do, does not necessarily lead to the cessation of fishing together, but perhaps a more mindful, ethical and sustainable approach of doing so.
I shared the same thoughts as you about T3 robots when reading through this paper. A T3 robot will look indistinguishable from a human and yet will have a computer in their head rather than a brain. By Key’s hypothesis, the T3 robot will not have feelings and will not have pain because they do not have a similar brain to humans. Yet from the outside, there would be no way for us to tell this. Therefore, by Key’s argument, I could look at the T3 robot and ‘vicariously experience’ their pain since I believe they have a similar brain to me. But if I were to find out that there was a computer rather than a human brain inside their head, I still would not kick the robot. If the T3 robot is telling me they experience pain, I am going to believe them regardless of it is actually true or not (and I have no way of knowing if it is actually true because of the other minds problem). The structure of their brain (or computer) is not something I can know and frankly, is not something that is very relevant. Thus, if a fish is displaying behaviours that seem to display pain, then I am going to believe that too.
DeleteAll good points, but don’t forget that what makes the hard problem of explaining feeling causally hard is explaining it adaptively (without simply assuming it).
DeleteWeek 11 is meant to counter the too-quick tendency to say “Ok, so maybe cogsci will only be able to solve the ‘easy’ problem of reverse-engineering how and why organisms can do all the (cognitive) things they can do, but not the ‘hard’ problem of how and why they feel. So maybe feeling doesn’t matter.”
This week was to remind us that not only does feeling matter: it’s the only thing that matters – the only reason anything (including the ‘easy’ problem) matters.
I thought this could be of interest:
ReplyDeleteOn the news recently, I came across a publication that the UK government stated that Octopuses, crabs and lobsters are to be recognized as sentient beings with feelings. Decapod crustaceans were until now not recognized under the animal welfare (sentience) bill, although it has been recognized for many years that octopuses are extremely smart. This acknowledgement would help protect these animals and prohibit their gruesome treatment, such as live boiling. I find it deplorable that this took so long and that it is first assumed that an animal is not sentient unless proved otherwise.
That UK debate was going on during this year's PSYC 538 course, including these two Webinars on Invertebrate Animal Sentience in October, starting with Jonathan Birch, an author in Animal Sentience the year after Brian Key, and one of the prime movers behind the UK invertebrate legislation that has just been passed. One of the four DAQ animal sentience interns for this project was Katherine Mills, who was a student in last year's PSYC 538.
DeleteA passage from this paper that made me reflect on what we have learned in this course was the following: “…we vicariously experience the pain of our friends and family members without ever really knowing what they actually feel.” Key then argues this is because we understand they have similar brains and processing systems. However, based on what we have learned in this course this is not a good reasoning to explain why another species does not feel pain. This is because while we might think that we understand the pain of our friends and family, this is no different than thinking we understand the pain of a fish or other animal. Because of the other minds problem, we are unable to experience the feelings or pain of any other human, animal or robot. Therefore, this is not a compelling argument for Key’s structure-function basis of this paper. While I can be sure that I myself do feel pain, I cannot be sure that any other being experiences pain the same as me. Even with humans’ ‘mind reading’, in which we can infer others feelings based on our own, I am still aware that people have different tolerance levels of pain. If I can vicariously experience the pain of other humans, then there would be no reason that I could not vicariously experience the pain of other animals or robot.
ReplyDeleteYes, and lazy evolution has also ensured that we don't only act when we are certain (otherwise we would never do anything at all).
DeleteFrom Key’s point of view, the conclusion that fish do not feel noxious stimuli is based on evolutionary biology and neuroscience. Given the arguments and ‘evidence’ that Key proposes, he was trying to examine whether fish have the neural architecture or the pain receptors and whether fish shows an ability to learn and respond to pain, which in other words, I wonder if it could be concluded as if they could categorize their first-person experience if they have. Key argues that fish do not feel pain because they don’t have the same biology to cause pain.
ReplyDeleteHowever, one question I had when I was reading this article is that, according to Key, the nervous system of fish does not have the ability to detect and reflexively react to harmful stimuli, but how could they correlate the behavior to the cause. One of the obstacles I could think of is how to discriminate their response between whether it is a reflex or is because the subject is in pain. By simply assuming that fish has no change in behavior after conducting experiments that ‘cause pain’ (such as craniotomy) on fish, and then coming up with the conclusion that fish does not feel pain seems problematic. First, it is known that the pain response is individual, and what can be painful to one person can only be mildly unpleasant to another: our perception of pain is influenced not only by physical injury or sensation. The observable behavior of the fish can’t be the only factor that we consider determining the reason for the behavior of fish. I wonder if an analogy or counterexample could still be the Chinese room argument. The subject reaches the state of behavior equivalence but through a different pathway without feeling or understanding. Reasoning backward, I wonder if it could be considered as a case proving that it is problematic to reason the cause of the behavior without knowing the causal mechanism of the inner states of any individual. Another problematic key point in Key’s article is the arguments by analogy: denying that fish could feel pain because they have a different neurological architecture from other organisms, like ourselves, which believed to have the ability to consciously feel pain is like assuming mantis shrimp do not possess vision since they don’t have the same anatomical structure as human to integrate visual information though there exist 12 kinds of cones on the retina of mantis shrimp. One counterexample would be the octopus, which along with lobsters and crabs, has been classified as sentient beings among other animals in the UK recently since recent research shows that octopus might develop a nervous system that differs from humans that may still be capable of experiencing pain and suffering. In conclusion, several issues are worth further discussing in the arguments given by Key. However, I think at least this article tells me that, to find the evidence showing that animals could experience pain or pleasure, we must go back to the fundamental question: what it means for an animal to be sentient.
Good points. And, yes, according to Key's reasoning neither Mantis shrimp nor hermit crabs can see. All they have is optokinetic reflexes, like a burgler alarm camera.
DeletePeizhao, I find that you hit the head on the nail with one of the concerns about the paper, but actually help me elaborate on it and put it into better words which has helped me understand better. As you mentioned that we don't have any accurate way of correlating behavior to cause, we can't know that a fishes change in behavior after experiments is indicative of their "internal" response to painful stimuli. I also wondered if this could be that the expression of pain is completely different for fish than it is for humans (we might expect humans to squirm when they feel a shocking painful stimuli, so we expect a similar/analagous reaction in fish, but we can't know for sure how a fish would behaviourally respond to pain, because we don't know when or if they actually feel that pain). I also think about how unfelt internal functions can impact behavior and Key does not fully take this into account with his proposed method.
DeleteFish do react to being injured, much the way other invertebrates do.
DeleteIt is interesting that the author himself admits that due to the nature of the question, it is impossible to fully determine if fish can feel pain.
ReplyDelete"Given that explaining consciousness is generally considered the hardest problem of neuroscience, it is not
surprising that simple demonstrations or proof are not available."
Here, we see again the hard problem to try to understand how (if) fish experience pain. The author considers showing evidence that fish do not process pain in a similar way as human as adequate to demonstrate that fish do not feel pain. This seems to me like the author is merely trying to answer a question without the proper neuro-biological tools. To truly determine if a fish can feel pain we would be faced with the other minds problems, which would be circular. I believe by default we can only assume that the fish feels; to truly prove it we would have to face the other minds problem, but we can infer it with a better neuro-biological understanding of how fish function (not with a comparison with how we feel pain) -elyass A.
The OMP and the HP are not the same problem.
DeleteReading through this article, it seems that Key is projecting in a strange way. While lamenting “unsupported anthropomorphic conclusions” such as fish feeling emotions like humans, while his own argument against fish feeling pain is based on how humans feel pain. I see some kind of irony here. A general issue with arguments against a given animal “feeling” is that the criteria are extremely difficult to reach and are based on humans, the only lifeform that we know definitely feels—and even at that, I really only know that I myself feel. Of course, proving without a shred of doubt that an animal feels has not been possible thus far; this is the other minds problem, after all. However, it would not be fair to fish to assume that they don’t feel due to lack of evidence. Such an assumption could lead to significant suffering should fish actually feel pain. I feel that it is significantly more humane to give fish the “benefit of the doubt” and assume that they feel pain until proven otherwise.
ReplyDeleteMilo, I agree with your points. I think it is difficult to determine whether fish feel at this point because we cannot access their feelings directly and cannot make definite conclusions on their feelings drawing from behaviors or neurological events. As some of the critiques mention, there are issues in that fish have different behaviors and brain structures, making the comparison to humans insufficient. Additionally, there is limited knowledge on how sentients in the human brain function, thus making sentients in the fish brain harder to determine as well. It seems to me that because we do not have enough information to solve the hard problem at this point, it would be most logical to take the easy problem and assume from their behavior or what is observable that fish can feel. This is what we do for other humans, so the same procedure seems logical for fish as well.
DeleteMarisa, the OMP is not the same thing as the HP, and the EP can only give correlations. But if you were the victim, you would want us to adopt the Precautionary Principle, ad Milo does.
DeleteMy classmates have touched on many of the problems with Key's article, and I completely agree with them on the basis of comparing a T3 robot to a fish, in terms of how they should be treated and how the other minds problem comes into play. My one question is, where do we separate animals from other organisms, when determining if they could possibly feel pain and consciousness, other than a sort of "common sense", where one could disregard plants and assume they do not experience consciousness. There is no way of being certain, but we take it for granted that plans do not have these sorts of experiences. What about single-celled organisms, what about bacteria and amoebas? Is there a cut-off line, and should there be? When do we decide that we are 'certain' another object does not feel?
ReplyDeleteAlex, I see what you means, but I don't think that the point here is to suppose that fish have feelings simply based on the fact that we can never know, because of the other minds problem. Of course, it is true that we will never be able to know for sure if fish feel pain; however, that doesn't mean that we can't make reasonable inferences based on scientific data.
DeleteI feel like it's a bit similar to any other science : we'll never really know for sure if the theory of gravitation is true, but we can reasonably infer that it is from the amount of data we've found that supports it and the absence of contradictory data. Similarly, when we look at the commentaries to Key's article, they are not appealing to the OTM: they are using evolution and neuroscience to argue that, based on the information we have from our own nervous system and our own feeling of pain, and the resemblance between our nervous system and that of fish (and other organisms we already consider to feel pain), it would be reasonable to suppose that fish can cause pain. This reasoning couldn't be applied to rocks, bacteria or anything, because no evidence points to the conclusion that they could feel pain.
Alex, you are right to ask where is the cut-off line. The reason most people put it at plants and microbes today is that they lack a nervous system, which is the organ of feeling (there are no other candidates).
DeleteLouise, perhaps the OMP is not that much more underdetermined than the rest of science, but the HP certainly is!
I agree with what my classmates say about Key’s views on pain in fish. I find it wrong to assume that an organism does not feel pain just because it does not have the same biological mechanisms as humans. Humans can be so conceited that they tend to think that certain feelings are ‘made’ for them specifically. I was even more flabbergasted when I realized that this was a fairly recent paper (2016), and one would think that by 2016, it would have been a common agreement among scientists not to make such assumptions.
ReplyDeleteAs mentioned in other skywritings, it might just be that fish experience pain differently. It is also a (very unlikely) possibility that they don’t feel pain, but why would we directly jump to that conclusion, given all the scientific data out there? Probably just to make ourselves feel better about all the persecution being done to fish, or animals in general (Cognitive dissonance, in other words).
Yes, cognitive dissonance. Also "scientistic" detachment. And a misunderstanding or misapplication of Occam's Razor and Lloyd-Morgan's canon (q.v.).
DeleteThe proposition is that it is impossible to ever know what a fish feels, and as a consequence fish should be given the “benefit of the doubt” and unconditionally bestowed with the ability to feel pain” based on my interpretation of this, it reminds me very much of the other - minds problem. This manner of thinking that he applies to fish is the same thinking that we would apply to other humans or an Eric. Rather than potentially hurt someone, it is safe to assume that if I introduced “noxious stimuli” it would cause pain and we should give them “the benefit of the doubt” and just not do it. From here, a fish consciousness is as unreachable as my neighbour’s consciousness. The author then attributes the difference in justifying potentially causing a fish pain and potentially causing pain in fellow humans is biological structure. What is relevant here is how do we and if they do, how do fish, Know they are in pain? Thus, he assumes that this feeling is stored in biological structure. He quotes “we intuitively understand that humans share similar functioning nervous systems and behaviours and therefore will experience similar feelings”. Fish also have nerves and therefore a nervous system. In fact, the squid is the animal that was crucial in demonstrating the nervous system and brain axons. This idea is therefore paradoxical, because how can we argue that the squid nervous system is translatable enough to humans but not enough to conclude that fish feel pain? This also doesn’t even begin to cover the fact that knowing that you are in pain may not be stored in biological system at all.
ReplyDeleteAdditionally, some of the author’s arguments don’t seem to be that necessary either. He puts forth that the “benefit of the doubt can quickly lead to unsupported anthropomorphic conclusions such as believing fish either feel happy being in company of other fish, or they feel disappointed when they fail to capture prey”. I don’t understand how this relates to the argument at hand and seems like an unnecessary addition.
If the organ of feeling is not the nervous system, what else might be? (Look it up to see whether you are flirting with dualism!
DeleteI am a bit skeptical regarding the methodology used in Brian Key's paper. From what I understand, the author is using a very anthropomorphic definition of pain by defining it as a function of human (or mammalian) physiology and neuroanatomy. Even his claim that "Pain is in the brain" seems really bold, seeing as octopuses (who are increasingly recognized as sentient beings) have the majority of their neurons in their peripheral nervous system.
ReplyDeleteThe following excerpt from the conclusion sums up his perspective nicely: "there is no sound biological reason to extend these feelings [such as pain and pleasure] to vertebrates that lack the underlying neuroanatomy and physiology responsible for such feelings in humans."
I think that by defining pain as being the product of typically human (or mammalian) physiological structures, his research has no hope of demonstrating the existence of pain in fish for the simple reason that they do not have a human (or mammalian) physiology.
If we define "human-like pain" to be what its like for a human to feel pain, all this paper is showing is that by lacking the necessary mammalian structures for human-like pain, fish lack the ability to feel human-like pain. Logically, this makes perfect sense, but it still doesn't prove that fish can't feel (fish-like) pain or suffer, as a product of different physiological or neuroanatomical structures.
The flaw in this methodology (structure determines function) can be illustrated by the following example: if fish had evolved a specific set of physiological structures paired with unique neuroanatomical structures that allowed for them to experience fish-like pain, this "mapping of structural homologies" used by the author would fail to associate these unique structures to the feeling of pain because researchers would only be looking for specifically mammalian structures in the fish to assess their ability to feel pain. In a nutshell, I don't see how this method can draw meaningful conclusions about pain in fish when they are completely overlooking the possibility for alternative structures with a similar function.
Octopus may not have centralized nervous systems, but they certainly have nervous systems!
DeleteI find similar issues with Key’s logic that I found while reading Dennett’s argument for why heterephenomenelogical methods could help us understand why humans think and feel what they do. By assuming that establishing analogous structure-function relationships between human and fish will help us understand where the neural correlates of pain are and thus how/why they feel assumes we can use these same methods to understand why human beings feel, which we know they cannot. As a classmate pointed out in the 10b reading, the OMP gives insight to why this is; we are not fish so we can never know what they feel, if they feel, and even if we did happen to know what they feel, it still would not tell us why, which is the hard problem.
ReplyDeleteFish would have the OMP with one another (if they could bother with such things), and they would not only give one another the benefit of the doubt, but they would mind-read one another (as much as lazy evolution endowed them with the capacity to do).
DeleteIn his paper, Key states that fishes do not feel pain because “fish lack the necessary neuroanatomical structures or neural circuits to perform neural processing necessary for feeling pain”(page.4) But I would argue that: 1, the OMP preventing us to empirically test if fish feels pain; 2, it is a very anthropocentric view to judge other species’ feeling by solely comparing to human anatomy; 3, even though if we are not talking about objective experience like pain, other functions of an organism might correlated (*not causality) with different neural mechanisms than human.
ReplyDeleteEvolutionary speaking, human evolved the ability to perceive pain is one mechanism that support our survival (pain is an important indicator of body function, give you feedback of where is injured, etc), however, due to the different environment for which organism to evolve, this ability may exhibit differently. There are other behavior/mechanisms for other species to protect themselves, yet human being does not have. As many comments mentioned, I think the anthropocentric view of consciousness is very problematic.
But don’t forget that although the assumption that the nervous system is the organ that generates pain (and all feeling capacity) is surely right, and the fact that pain (and all feeling capacity) surely evolved because it conferred Darwinian advantages is true, don’t forget the hard problem of explaining how and why…
DeleteIn this paper, Key argues that fish do not feel pain, because fish lacks the biological structure responsible for pain. He argues that pain is in the brain. Then he identifies the neurological structure in human brain which is responsible for feeling pain, and examines the anatomy of fish to determine whether fish have similar neuroanatomical structure. He concludes that “fish lack the necessary neuroanatomical structures or neural circuits to perform neural processing necessary for feeling pain”.
ReplyDeleteI find the argument anthropocentric in determine the feeling of pain based on whether they possess neuroanatomical structure similar to human. While it is possible that the feeling of pain can be realized by other kinds of neuroanatomical structure, why treat human brain as the sole indicator of the feeling of pain? Maybe the feeling of pain does depend on the biological structure an organism has, but it is still possible that other biological structure can produce feelings analogous to the feeling of pain.
I do acknowledge that the problem discussed here is a result of the others-mind problem—we cannot know for sure what other creatures feel. It creates the difficulties in the study of the feelings of others, especially other species. If we solely rely on observations of behaviours, then we face the problem of anthropomorphism. However, if we want to use the biological evidence, then the problem is that the only feeling we can access directly is our own feelings. For other fellow human beings, the advantage of language gives us another source of accessing to others’ feelings. Hence, we can establish the correlation between the brain and feelings within out own species. However, we do not have a reliable way of doing that to other species. If we just generalize the result of our species and apply them to other species, we face the problem of anthropocentricism.
Yes, if other species could talk, it would help (them). But do they really need to? I think our mind-reading capacities are enough -- if we use them (despite cognitive dissonance).
ReplyDelete